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Compensation and the California Guest
Statute: Updating the Tangible
Benefit and Motivation Tests
By Daniel J. Kelly*
S INCE 1929 an automobile host in California has been partially protec-
ted from liability to his injured guest by the California Guest Statute.' In
summary, this statute has the effect of reducing the common law duty of
care which the host owes to his guest. Unless the rider in the vehicle has
paid compensation for the ride, there may only be recovery for death
or injury which results from the driver's intoxication or willful mis-
conduct.2  The primary policy underlying the statute is to prevent
recovery for ordinary negligence by one who has accepted the hospi-
tality of the driver. A secondary policy is to prevent collusive suits
(i.e., the driver admits negligence to assure compensation for his
victim).,
* B.A., 1963, San Jose State College; J.D., 1969, University of Santa Clara
School of Law; Member, California Bar.
1. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158: "No person riding in or occupying a vehicle
owned by him and driven by another person with his permission and no person who as
a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for
such ride, nor any other person, has any right of action for civil damages against the
driver of the vehicle or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of the
driver on account of personal injury to or the death of the owner or guest during the
ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes that the injury or death proxi-
mately resulted from the intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver."
2. As originally enacted, the statute also permitted recovery in cases of gross
negligence. Cal. Stat. 1929, ch. 787, § 1, at 1580. In the 1931 amendment to the
statute the gross negligence language was eliminated. Cal. Stat. 1931, ch. 812, § 1, at
1693. 2 B. WTKrN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 353, at 1555 (1960).
3. See, e.g., Morrison v. Townley, 269 Cal. App. 2d 863, 75 Cal. Rptr. 274
(1969); Sand v. Mahnan, 248 Cal. App. 2d 679, 56 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1967); Stephan v.
Proctor, 235 Cal. App. 2d 228, 45 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1965). It has also been suggested
that the true motivation of the statute is to benefit liability insurance companies. Com-
ment, Statutes Releasing Owner or Driver from Liability for Negligence Toward Guest,
18 CALm. L. REv. 184, 194 (1930). The insurance industry has long feared that
host-guest litigation could only lead to its financial exsanguination in the absence of a
guest statute. It is difficult to discover an empirical-or rational-basis for that fear,
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While both courts and legal commentators have directly and
indirectly questioned the constitutionality of the Guest Act,' it is never-
theless still the law in California. However, the various elements of
this comparatively succinct statute have undergone a number of
judicial interpretations and constructions. In the 1967 decision of
O'Donnell v. Mullaney,4a for example, the California Supreme Court
held that the statute protects the driver from liability only when the
accident has occurred on a public highway. The host owes his guest
a duty of reasonable care when they are traveling on a private road.
In Williams v. Carr,5 decided the following year, the court held that
a guest's contributory negligence was not a bar to recovery. Rather,
the defendant, guilty of willful misconduct, must prove that the plain-
tiff was guilty of "contributory willful misconduct"-i.e., conduct in-
dicating that the guest had acted with a willful disregard for his own
safety.
Since compensation paid by the passenger renders inoperative
the restrictions of the Guest Act, host-guest litigation often involves
a determination of whether the rider is a passenger for compensation.
The word "compensation" has produced a plethora of appellate de-
cisions seeking to define its meaning. Recently the California Su-
preme Court has sought to clarify the distinction between a passenger
and a gratuitous guest. The purpose of this article is to examine the
judicial interpretations of the compensation provision of the California
Guest Act.
The Tangible Benefit Rule
Compensation, which makes the rider a passenger rather than a
guest, may consist of either a present or prospective tangible benefit
to the driver or his principal. Whether present or prospective, the
benefit must be a tangible benefit and not an incidental or customary
since 20 states do not have guest statutes. AM. JuR. 2D Desk Book, Doc. No. 123
(1962).
4. See, e.g., Olsen v. Clifton, 273 Cal. App. 2d 359, 370, 78 Cal. Rptr. 296, 302
(1969); Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases-Lots of Them (The California Guest
Statute), 9 SANTA CLARA LAw. 1 (1968), wherein the author argues that the "guest"
classification is irrational, serves no useful purpose, and thus is violative of the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution. In addition, various legislative
attempts (all unsuccessful) have been made to abolish California's guest statute. The
latest, Senate Bill 14, 1970 Reg. Sess., was introduced at the last legislative session by
State Senator John Nejedly.
4a. 66 Cal. 2d 994, 429 P.2d 160, 59 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1967).
5. 68 Cal. 2d 579, 440 P.2d 505, 68 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1968).
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courtesy of the road. Thus, the mere companionship of the rider does
not constitute a tangible benefit. 6 Moreover, compensation does not
result from the rider's extension of a courtesy, such as paying a bridge
toll during a trip.7
A. Present Benefits
Obviously, a money payment suffices as compensation," even if
made by someone on behalf of the passenger.9 Benefits accruing to
the driver in a form other than cash have also been held to be com-
pensation. For example, where the evidence shows that the rider paid
for his ride with reciprocated rides then the rider is, as a matter of law,
a passenger. 10 Similarly, compensation has been found where the
passenger has accompanied the driver to assist in the following mat-
ters: driving,"' loading and unloading, 2 route selection,13 selling,14
getting a job' 5 and even gift selection.'" In all of the above cases
the passenger has given compensation by assisting the driver in arriving
at his destination or fulfilling the object of his journey. The tangible
benefit rule is not satisfied if the assistance rendered is volunteered by
the rider as a courtesy during the ride; the driver must have requested
or contemplated the proffered benefit.
B. Prospective Benefits
Typically, compensation in the form of a prospective benefit has
been rendered when a prospective customer rides with the driver who
6. Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 288 P.2d 868 (1955) (dic-
turn); Whitechat v. Guyette, 19 Cal. 2d 428, 122 P.2d 47 (1942) (dictum); Christ v.
O'Neil, 28 Cal. App. 2d 651, 83 P.2d 96 (1938).
7. Whitechat v. Guyette, 19 Cal. 2d 428, 122 P.2d 47 (1942); McCann v. Hoff-
man, 9 Cal. 2d 279, 70 P.2d 909 (1937).
8. E.g., Whitechat v. Guyette, 19 Cal. 2d 428, 432, 122 P.2d 47, 50 (1942).
9. Smith v. Fall River Joint Union High School Dist., 118 Cal. App. 673, 5
P.2d 930 (1931).
10. Huebotter v. Follett, 27 Cal. 2d 765, 167 P.2d 193 (1946); Peccolo v. Los
Angeles, 8 Cal. 2d 532, 66 P.2d 651 (1937). But see Phillips v. Harper, 60 Cal. App.
2d 298, 140 P.2d 686 (1943).
11. Druzanich v. Criley, 19 Cal. 2d 439, 122 P.2d 53 (1942).
12. Fedler v. Hygelund, 106 Cal. App. 2d 480, 235 P.2d 247 (1951); Christiana v.
Rattaro, 81 Cal. App. 2d 597, 184 P.2d 682 (1947).
13. Lerma v. Flores, 16 Cal. App. 2d 128, 60 P.2d 546 (1936).
14. Haney v. Takakura, 2 Cal. App. 2d 1, 37 P.2d 170 (1934).
15. Fachadio v. Krovitz, 62 Cal. App. 2d 362, 144 P.2d 646 (1944).
16. Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal. 2d 237, 143 P.2d 704 (1943). Bui see Lundell v.
Hackbarth, 226 Cal. App. 2d 609, 38 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1964) wherein it was held that
rendering advice on olive selection was so trivial an act that the jury was justified in'
finding that it was not compensation for the ride.
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is attempting to obtain his passenger's business. Thus, the prospective
automobile buyer who is given a demonstration ride with the salesman
is not a guest receiving a ride without compensation. 17  The same
rationale applies when the host provides transportation to the potential
customer to facilitate the inspection of real estate 8 or the discussion
of some other business transaction. 9 It is not necessary for the host to
realize an immediate profit as a result of the transaction in question.
The mere hope of a future profit is a sufficient prospective tangible
benefit.
20
The intent of the parties with regard to the ride is crucial in es-
tablishing whether there is a tangible benefit flowing from rider to
driver. Thus, the intent with which the ride is offered and accepted
(either as expressed or disclosed by acts) must be considered and
evaluated. 2' A determination of intent obviously involves the evalua-
tion of subjective elements, for a benefit that is incidental to one man
may be important to another. It is thus impossible to generalize
about the decisional law in this area. A jury's determination on this
question should rarely be disturbed since it is truly a factual question
that can only be decided in light of all of the evidence presented.
C. Share-the-Expense Rides
An often litigated situation is that of the motor trip or excursion
where the driver and rider agree to share the expenses.22 The law on
this question has changed in the past 20 years. Under the former
California law as exemplified by McCann v. Hoffman,23 the determina-
tion of guest or passenger status was dependent upon the purpose of the
trip. If the trip were for a business or nonsocial purpose, the agree-
17. Riley v. Bekeley Motors, Inc., I Cal. App. 2d 217, 36 P.2d 398 (1934);
Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 293 P. 841 (1930). See also Follansbee v.
Benzenberg, 122 Cal. App. 2d 466, 265 P.2d 183 (1954).
18. Parrett v. Carothers, 11 Cal. App. 2d 222, 53 P.2d 1023 (1936); Sullivan v.
Richardson, 119 Cal. App. 367, 6 P.2d 567 (1931).
19. Piercy v. Zeiss, 8 Cal. App. 2d 595, 47 P.2d 818 (1935) (insurance agent
drove plaintiff to her home after she declined to purchase a policy).
20. Id.
21. Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal. 2d 237, 143 P.2d 704 (1943).
22. See generally Comment, Applicability of the Califo~nia Guest Statute to
Share-the-Expense Motor Trips, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 853 (1955); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d
1097 (1966).
23. 9 Cal. 2d 279, 70 P.2d 909 (1937). McCann involved two couples who
shared expenses (based on an understanding from previous excursions) on a pleasure
trip. On appeal, it was held that the sharing of the cost of gasoline and oil on a
pleasure trip was merely the exchange of social amenities.
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ment to share expenses was held to be compensation; if the trip were
merely a social outing, the share-the-expense agreement was an inci-
dental or common courtesy of the road.
24
In Whitmore v. French25 this arbitrary rule or distinction was
seemingly put to rest. Whitmore involved close friends who had been
vacationing in the western United States. During their trip each agreed
to contribute equally to a common fund for gasoline, oil, meals, lodging
and sight-seeing. The court held that the purpose of the trip was irrele-
vant in determining the applicability of the Guest Statute:
[I]t has been held that the sharing of expenses does not destroy
the host and guest relationship if nothing more is involved than
the exchange of social amenities and reciprocal hospitality. [Cita-
tions omitted.] Where, however, the driver receives a tangible
benefit, monetary or otherwise, which is a motivating influence for
furnishing the transportation, the rider is a passenger and the
driver is liable for ordinary negligence. [Citations omitted.] This
is, of course, true whether the trip is for the joint pleasure of partici-
pants or is of a non-social nature. [Citations omitted.]
2 6
Six years later, in Ray v. Hanisch,17 the court of appeal held that
no consideration existed in a share-the-expense prearrangement, al-
though the trip would have not been made if there had been no agree-
ment.2 Somewhat perplexing, the Ray court cited the Whitmore
case to support its holding. As one commentator has apty- put it,
"[lt seems that where the Guest Act is concerned . . . the supreme
court often seems to gain grudging acceptance-at best-from the
intermediate appellate court."29
To further confuse matters, Standard California Jury Instructions,
in defining the guest-passenger distinction, did not follow the mandate
of the Whitmore decision; rather, the purpose of the trip was deemed
controlling."0
24. Id.
25. 37 Cal. 2d 744, 235 P.2d 3 (1951).
26. Id. at 746, 235 P.2d at 5 (1951).
27. 147 Cal. App. 2d 742, 306 P.2d 30 (1957).
28. Id. at 750, 306 P.2d at 35.
29. Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases-Lots of Them (The California Guest
Statute), 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1, 26 (1968).
30. 2 BAlI No. 209 (4th ed. 1956) provided, inter alia: "However, the mere
sharing of expenses of a motor trip, such as for gasoline and oil, does not, in and of
itself, cause the rider who pays part of such expense to be a passenger, rather than a
guest. If such a contribution is the motivating influence for furnishing the transpor-
tation, if the arrangement has a character similar to that of a business agreement, then
the payment is compensation for the ride,' and one who thus rides and pays or agrees to
pay is a passenger; but if the purpose of the trip is merely the joint pleasure of the
participants, if that objective is what led to the trip as a social occasion, then the shar-
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During the 1969 term the California Supreme Court clarified this
area of host-guest law. In Nevarez v. Carrasco3' the plaintiff had
promised to "make it right" with the defendant if the latter drove him
from Watsonville to San Mateo, California. He further agreed to
supply gas for the trip and testified at the trial that he did buy gas before
the accident occurred. The trial court instructed the jury using the
"purpose of the trip" distinction between guest and passenger. On
appeal, the supreme court held that it is irrelevant whether the trip is
for the joint pleasure of the participants or is of a nonsocial nature. Re-
iterating its Whitmore decision, the court stated:
A rider does not accept the hospitality of the driver when the rider
"pays his own way" and the driver furnishes the transportation be-
cause of the circumstance. It is the element of compensation and
not the purpose of the trip which is the relevant criterion in ascer-
taining whether the rider is merely accepting the hospitality of
the driver.
32
Thus, the court held that the trial court's instruction on the "purpose
of the trip" distinction was prejudicial error.
The supreme court's reaffirmation of, and the lower court's ad-
herence to,3" the rule enunciated in the Whitmore decision should pro-
vide both finality and rationality to share-the-expense litigation. The re-
cent court of appeal decision in Joslyn v. Callison3sa suggests that both
trial and intermediate appellate courts will now follow the supreme court's
lead. In Joslyn the court reversed a directed verdict for the defendant,
holding that "[t]he mandate of Nevarez . . .seems clear: Once it is es-
tablished that compensation flows from the rider to the driver-a sharing
of expenses-the rider's status presents a jury question. 33b This review
of the past irreconcilable (and disturbing) decisions on this question com-
pels the conclusion that finality and rationality were both long overdue.
34
ing of expenses is merely incidental, and one who thus rides with the driver, although
sharing in the expense, is a guest."
31. 1 Cal. 3d 518, 462 P.2d 577, 82 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1969).
32. Id. at 522, 462 P.2d at 480, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
33. In Nevarez the supreme court clearly implied that the lower courts had not
adhered to the Whitmore rule. Citing that case, the court stated: "Thus, as long ago
as 1951, we resolved the question presently before us." Nevarez v. Carrasco, I Cal. 3d
518, 522, 462 P.2d 577, 580, 82 Cal. Rptr. 721, 723 (1969).
33a. 12 Cal. App. 3d 788, 90 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1970).
33b. Id. at 794, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
34. Following its Nevarez decision, the California Supreme Court again com-
mented on the erroneous "purpose of the trip" test in Bozanich v. Kenney, 3 Cal. 3d
567, 477 P.2d 142, 91 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1970): "The trial court also erred in instructing
the jury essentially in the form of BAJI (4th ed.) 209, which was disapproved in part
in Nevarez v. Carrasco. . . . We there pointed out that part of the instruction er-
roneously implies that the purpose of 'joint pleasure' would render the plaintiff a guest
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The Motivation Test-
The law has long required that there be a connection between the
compensation and the ride: the compensation must have played some
role in inducing the driver to furnish the transportation. In McCann
v. Hoffman 5 the California Supreme Court held that the tangible
benefit was compensation only if it was the motivating influence. Four-
teen years later the same court held in Whitmore v. French36 that the
tangible benefit is compensation if it is a motivating influence. This
inconsistency of decisions was particularly brought to light when, only
11 months after the Whitmore decision, the court in dictum again used
the wording of the McCann decision but cited Whitmore as authority!
37
In 1957 the court in Gillespie v. Rawlings38 judicially recognized the
variance of its decisions and attempted a clarification with the fol-
lowing language:
[C]ases which use the phrase "a motivating influence" and those
which use the phrase "the motivating influence" do not, because of
this difference in phraseology, state different principles. The
thought conveyed by both groups of cases is that the tangible bene-
fit, not mere pleasure, kindness, or friendship alone, must be the
principle inducement for the ride to constitute compensation.
39
Thereafter, standardized jury instructions in California spoke of
compensation as "[a] [the] chief inducement,"40 "[a] [the] motivating
influence ' 41 or "[a] [the] principle inducement ' 42 for the ride. In
Nevarez v. Carrasco43 the California Supreme Court reconsidered and
clarified the matter with the following footnote language:
Some cases decided since Whitmore may have contributed to an
erosion of its interpretation of the guest statute. In both Gillespie
v. Rawlings (1957), 49 Cal. 2d 359, 364-365 [317 P.2d 601],
and Baker v. Novak (1965), 144 Cal. App. 2d 514, 519-520 [301
P.2d 257], it is suggested that there is no significant difference be-
regardless of the importance of any consideration paid to the defendant." Id. at 572,
477 P.2d at 145, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
35. 9 Cal. 2d 279, 70 P.2d 909 (1937).
36. 37 Cal. 2d 744, 235 P.2d 3 (1951).
37. Clifford v. Ruocco, 39 Cal. 2d 327, 328 & n.1, 246 P.2d 651, 652 & n.1 (1952).
In light of the inconsistency between them, it is interesting to note that Chief Justice
Gibson authored both the Whitmore and Clifford decisions.
38. 49 Cal. 2d 359, 317 P.2d 601 (1957).
39. Id. at 364, 317 P.2d at 604.
40. 2 BAJI No. 209 (4th ed. 1956). Double brackets in original indicate
alternative wording.
41. Id.
42. BAJI No. 5.65 (5th ed. 1969). Double- brackets in original indicate alterna-
tive wording.
43. 1 Cal. 3d 518, 462 P.2d 577, 82 Cal. Rptr.. 721 (1969).
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tween an instruction requiring that compensation be a motivating
influence for furnishing the transportation and one which requires
that compensation be the motivating influence. Whitmore refers to"a motivating influence" and thus implicitly recognized that a num-
ber of reasons may underlie a driver's decision to provide transpor-
tation and the receipt of compensation need not be the sole reason.
Because requiring that compensation be the motivating influ-
ence may suggest the contrary interpretation, we prefer the Whit-
more language.44
Less than 1 year later the supreme court reinforced its Nevarez
decision in Bozanich v. Kenney.45  It is probable that the su-
preme court felt that if it were to clarify this area it would have to do it
in the body of a decision rather than in a footnote. Whatever the
reason, the Bozanich decision squarely held that it was error to in-
struct that the tangible benefit must be the chief or principal induce-
ment.46 Rather, it need only be a motivating influence.
While the conflict in "share-the-expense" cases resulted from the
refusal of the lower courts to follow the supreme court's lead, the
problems in the "motivation test" cases resulted from the supreme
court's failure to state a positive workable rule. In Nevarez and
Bozanich the court remedied its past failures.
Conclusion
The tangible benefit and motivation tests now enunciated by the
recent decisions of the supreme court will have the effect of narrowing
the application of the California Guest Statute. This result is consis-
tent with the long recognized view that the Guest Statute, as an excep-
tion in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed.
4 7
Critics will no doubt accuse the supreme court of attempts to interpret
away the staute or of exhibiting an over-solicitous penchant for finding
compensation. 48 Yet the fact remains that the decisions are merely re-
44. Id. at 522 & n.3, 462 P.2d at 580 & n.3, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 723 & n.3.
45. 3 Cal. 3d 567, 477 P.2d 142, 91 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1970).
46. In Bozanich the trial court instructed on "chief inducement" from 2 BAJI
No. 209 (4th ed. 1956). When the case reached the supreme court, a new edition of
BAJI had been published, using the phrase "the principal inducement." The court
struck down the language in the old edition and went on to note that the language in the
new edition intensified the error. 3 Cal. 3d at 572, 477 P.2d at 145, 91 Cal. Rptr.
at 289.
47. Bozanich v. Kenney, 3 Cal. 3d 567, 477 P.2d 142, 91 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1970);
Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal. 2d 89, 98 P.2d 729 (1940); Barr v. Carroll, 128 Cal. App. 2d
23, 274 P.2d 717 (1954).
48. These were criticisms made of the court following its Whitmore decision.
Comment, Applicability of the California Guest Statute to Share-the-Expense Motor
Trips, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 853, 858 (1955).
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iterations and clarifications of previously enunciated views.
It is now quite apparent that the California Supreme Court real-
ized that the compensation provision of the Guest Statute had engendered
a number of irreconcilable decisions. To remedy the situation the
court has firmly and unequivocally sought to clarify the entire area
with its recent decisions. It is hoped that its lead will not go unnoticed
by the state's trial and intermediate appellate courts.
APPENDIX
Proposed Jury Instructions
The recent California Supreme Court decisions on compensation
and the Guest Act have altered and/or struck down previous standard
jury instructions in this area. To assist in filling this present void,
the following jury instructions are proposed:
Subject: Compensation as Test of Passenger Status
The test whether a rider is a passenger or a guest is whether com-
pensation has been given or is expected to be given for the ride.
Compensation means a special tangible benefit to the driver which
was a motivating influence for furnishing the ride.
Nevarez v. Carrasco, 1 Cal. 3d 518, 522, 462 P.2d 577, 580, 82
Cal. Rptr. 721, 723 (1969);
Gillespie v. Rawlings, 49 Cal. 2d 359, 364, 317 P.2d 601, 604
(1957);
Whitmore v. French, 37 Cal. 2d 744, 746, 235 P.2d 3, 5 (1951);
Quicksall v. Levy, 217 Cal. App. 2d 599, 601-02, 31 Cal. Rptr.
702, 703-04 (1963).
Subject: Benefit as a Motivating Influence
A driver may have a number of reasons for providing transpor-
tation, and it is not necessary that an actual or expected benefit be
the sole reason for the ride in order to show that the rider is a pas-
senger for compensation. Such a benefit is sufficient to constitute
compensation if it was a motivating influence for the ride.
Bozanich v. Kenney, 3 Cal. 3d 567, 572, 477 P.2d 142, 145, 91
Cal. Rptr. 286, 289 (1970);
Nevarez v. Carrasco, 1 Cal. 3d 518, 522 n.3, 462 P.2d 577, 580
n.3, 82 Cal. Rptr. 721, 723 n.3 (1969).
Subject: Anticipated Benefit as Compensation
To constitute compensation it is not necessary that the driver
shall have received any payment from the rider before the accident.
Compensation may consist of a prospective or anticipated benefit to
be received by the driver from the rider at the end of the trip if that bene-
fit was one of the reasons which influenced the driver to furnish the
transportation.
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Martinez v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 251, 288 P.2d
868, 872 (1955);
Follansbee v. Benzenberg, 122 Cal. App. 2d 466, 471, 265 P.2d
183, 186(1954).
Subject: Sharing Expenses as Compensation
The rider is a passenger for compensation if there was an im-
plied or express agreement, understanding or arrangement between
the driver and the rider that the rider would pay part of the expenses
of the trip, or if both parties expected such payment, provided that
the expected payment was a motivating influence for furnishing the
transportaion.
Nevarez v. Carrasco, 1 Cal. 3d 518, 521-22, 462 P.2d 577, 580,
82 Cal. Rptr. 721,723 (1969);
Whitmore v. French, 37 Cal. 2d 744, 748, 235 P.2d 3, 5 (1951);
Joslyn v. Callison, 12 Cal. App. 3d 788, 793-94, 90 Cal. Rptr.
884, 887 (1970).
Subject. Purpose of Trip Not Decisive
The purpose of a trip does not determine whether or not the rider
is a passenger for compensation. The test is whether the driver was
to receive a special tangible benefit which was a motivating influence
in his decision to furnish transportation to the rider. This test applies re-
gardless of the purpose of the trip, whether it was social, educational,
for pleasure or otherwise.
Bozanich v. Kenney, 3 Cal. 3d 567, 572, 477 P.2d 142, 145, 91
Cal. Rptr. 286, 289 (1970);
Nevarez v. Carrasco, 1 Cal. 3d 518, 522, 462 P.2d 577, 580, 82
Cal. Rptr. 721,723 (1969);
Whitmore v. French, 37 Cal. 2d 744, 746, 235 P.2d 3, 5 (1951);
Joslyn v. Callison, 12 Cal. App. 3d 788, 793-94, 90 Cal. Rptr.
884, 887 (1970).
1243May 1971] CALIFORNIA GUEST STATUTE

